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Separate	  But	  Equal	  Accountability:	  The	  Case	  of	  Omar	  Khadr	  
	  




This	  Note	  addresses	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  to	  hold	  child	  combatants	  or	  
their	   commanders	   accountable	   for	   war	   crimes,	   and	   if	   so,	   how	   and	   to	   what	  
extent.	   	   The	   author	   ultimately	   concludes	   that	   child	   combatants	   and	   their	  
commanders	   should	   be	   held	   equally	   accountable	   for	   their	   actions,	   but	   by	  
measures	   that	   appropriately	   balance	   individual	   and	   public	   interests	   in	  
rehabilitation,	  reintegration,	  and	  deterrence.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Note	  focuses	  on	  Omar	  Khadr,	  a	  former	  child	  combatant,	  while	  using	  
other	   cases	   as	   a	   reference	   point	   for	   current	   international	   legal	   norms.	   	   The	  
author	   analyzes	   Khadr’s	   combatant	   status	   review,	   subsequent	   legal	  
proceedings,	   detention,	   and	   sentence	   in	   light	   of	   various	   legal	   and	   policy	  
considerations.	   	   The	   author	   maintains	   that	   despite	   the	   objectionable	   means	  
used	   to	   obtain	   Khadr’s	   conviction,	   it	   was	   at	   least	   proportionate	   to	   the	   war	  
crimes	  that	  he	  allegedly	  committed.	  	  However,	  the	  author	  also	  suggests	  which	  
measures	   would	   have	   been	   more	   appropriate	   under	   the	   circumstances	   and	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I.	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
This	   past	   year	   marked	   a	   watershed	   for	   international	   juvenile	   justice.	  	  
Omar	  Khadr,	  a	  Canadian	  national	  who	  was	  captured	  as	  a	  minor	  by	  US	  forces	  in	  
Afghanistan	   and	   detained	   for	   over	   eight	   years	   in	   Guantánamo,	   was	   finally	  
repatriated	  to	  his	  homeland	  after	  accepting	  a	  plea	  agreement.1	  	  	  Meanwhile	  in	  
The	  Hague,	  Thomas	  Lubanga	  Dyilo	  became	  the	  first	  defendant	  convicted	  by	  the	  
International	  Criminal	  Court	  (“ICC”)	  for	  enlisting	  and	  using	  child	  soldiers	  under	  
the	  age	  of	   fifteen.2	   	   	  These	  cases	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	   issues	  that	  
                                                
1	  Omar	  Khadr	  returns	  to	  Canada,	  CBC	  NEWS	  CANADA	  (Sept.	  29,	  2012)	  [hereinafter	  CBC	  Report],	  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/09/29/omar-­‐khadr-­‐repatriation.html.	  
2	  David	  Smith,	  Thomas	  Lubanga	  sentenced	  to	  14	  years	  for	  Congo	  War	  Crimes,	  THE	  GUARDIAN	  
2013]	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still	   pervade	   the	   effective	   administration	   of	   juvenile	   justice	   abroad.	  	  
Specifically,	   this	   article	   addresses	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   to	   hold	   child	  
combatants	  or	   their	   commanders	  accountable	   for	  war	  crimes,	  and	   if	   so,	  how	  
and	  to	  what	  extent.	  	  The	  article	  focuses	  on	  Khadr’s	  case	  while	  using	  Lubanga’s	  
case	  and	  others	  as	  a	  reference	  point	  for	  current	  international	  legal	  norms.	  	  
Part	   II	   provides	   background	   information	   on	   the	   “War	   on	   Terror,”	  
Guantánamo	  Bay,	  and	  Khadr’s	  case.	  	  Part	  III	  analyzes	  Khadr’s	  combatant	  status	  
review	   in	   light	   of	   legal	   and	   policy	   considerations	   and	   asserts	   that	   he	   should	  
have	  been	  classified	  as	  a	  child	  soldier.	   	  Part	   IV	  discusses	  the	  consequences	  of	  
Khadr’s	   status	   review,	   including	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   his	   subsequent	   legal	  
proceedings	  and	  detention,	   relative	   to	   the	   special	  protections	   that	  he	   should	  
have	   received	   as	   a	   juvenile.	   	   Part	   V	   analyzes	   Khadr’s	   plea	   agreement	   and	  
sentence,	  and	  maintains	  that	  despite	  the	  objectionable	  means	  used	  to	  obtain	  
them,	  the	  end	  result	  was	  at	  least	  proportionate	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  he	  allegedly	  
committed.	   	   Part	   VI	   concludes	   that	   child	   combatants	   and	   their	   commanders	  
should	  be	  held	  equally	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions,	  but	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  For	  
this	   reason,	   I	   explain	   which	   accountability	  measures	   would	   have	   been	  more	  
appropriate	  under	  the	  circumstances	  and	  recommend	  measures	  that	  could	  be	  
taken	  with	  respect	  to	  similar	  cases	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
II.	  	  BACKGROUND	  
	  
A. 	  The	  “War	  on	  Terror”	  
	  
	   	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
“continuing	   and	   immediate	   threat	   of	   further	   attacks	   on	   the	   United	   States,”	  
President	  Bush	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.3	   	  Congress	  also	  passed	  a	   joint	  
resolution,	   authorizing	   the	   President	   to	   use	   “all	   necessary	   and	   appropriate	  
force	  against	  those	  nations,	  organizations,	  or	  persons	  he	  determines	  planned,	  
authorized,	   committed,	   or	   aided	   the	   terrorist	   attacks	   that	   occurred	   on	  
September	   11,	   2001,	   or	   harbored	   such	   organizations	   or	   persons,	   in	   order	   to	  
prevent	  any	  future	  acts	  of	  international	  terrorism	  against	  the	  United	  States.”4	  	  	  
This	  “War	  on	  Terror”	  has	  continued	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  
	  
B. Guantánamo	  Military	  Commissions	  
	  
	   In	   November	   2001,	   President	   Bush	   authorized	   the	   use	   of	   military	  
                                                                                                                             
(July	  10,	  2012),	  available	  at	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/10/icc-­‐sentences-­‐
thomas-­‐lubanga-­‐14-­‐years.	  
3	  Proclamation	  No.	  7463,	  66	  Fed.	  Reg.	  48199	  (Sept.	  14,	  2001),	  available	  at	  
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/09/fr091801.html.	  
4	  S.J.	  Res.	  23,	  107th	  Cong.	  (2001),	  available	  at	  
http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/warpower/sj23.pdf.	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commissions	   to	   try	   suspected	   terrorists	   for	   crimes.5	   	   US	   facilities	   in	  
Guantánamo	   Bay,	   Cuba	   opened	   in	   2002	   to	   detain	   “unlawful	   enemy	  
combatants”	   captured	   in	   the	   “War	   on	   Terror”	   and	   to	   further	   investigate	  
threats	   of	   terrorism.6	   	   Some	   practices	   in	   Guantánamo	   have	   been	   heavily	  
criticized.7	   	   The	   aim	   of	   this	   Note,	   however,	   is	   to	   examine	   one	   case	   in	  more	  
detail,	   while	   attempting	   to	   reserve	   any	   judgment	   on	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   or	  
general	  practices	  in	  Guantánamo.	  
	   In	  response	  to	  criticism,	  and	  upon	  taking	  office	  in	  2009,	  President	  Obama	  
halted	   the	   proceedings	   to	   review	   their	   continued	   use.	   	   The	   President	   soon	  
issued	   an	   executive	   order	   requiring	   that	   Guantánamo	   be	   closed	   less	   than	   a	  
year	   from	   that	   date.8	   	   The	   deadline	   for	   closing	   the	   detention	   facility	   at	  
Guantánamo	   passed,	   but	   the	   Obama	   administration	   reportedly	   determined	  
that	   about	   50	   of	   the	   suspects	   held	   there	   would	   continue	   to	   be	   detained	  
without	  trial,	  about	  40	  detainees	  would	  be	  prosecuted	  in	  military	  commissions	  
or	   federal	   court,	   and	   the	   remaining	   110	   detainees	   would	   be	   released	   to	  
suitable	  countries	  that	  have	  agreed	  to	  accept	  them.9	  
	  
C. 	   	  Omar	  Khadr	  
	  
	   The	   American	   Civil	   Liberties	   Union	   recently	   estimated	   that	   since	  
Guantánamo’s	   opening,	   the	   prison	   has	   detained	   21	   alleged	   juvenile	  
offenders.10	  	  One	  such	  offender,	  Omar	  Khadr,	  was	  only	  fifteen	  years	  old	  when	  
he	  was	   captured	  by	  U.S.	   forces	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	   taken	   into	  U.S.	   custody.11	  	  
Khadr	  was	   transferred	  to	  Guantánamo	   in	  2003,	  where	  he	  was	  charged	  under	  
                                                
5	  Detention,	  Treatment,	  and	  Trial	  of	  Certain	  Non-­‐Citizens	  in	  the	  War	  Against	  Terrorism,	  66	  Fed.	  
Reg.	  57833	  (Nov.	  16,	  2001),	  §	  1(a),	  available	  at	  
http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/warpower/fr1665.pdf,	  see	  also	  Department	  of	  
Defense,	  President	  Determines	  Enemy	  Combatants	  Subject	  to	  His	  Military	  Order	  (July	  3,	  2003),	  
available	  at	  http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5511.	  
6	  Meagan	  McElroy,	  Features:	  Guantánamo	  Bay,	  JURIST	  (updated	  Apr.	  20,	  2013),	  available	  at	  
http://jurist.org/feature/2012/01/guantanamo.php.	  
7	  See,	  e.g.,	  Amnesty	  International,	  Speech	  by	  Irene	  Khan	  at	  Foreign	  Press	  Association	  (May	  25,	  
2005)	  (regarding	  allegations	  of	  abuse	  and	  torture	  at	  Guantánamo),	  available	  at	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20060220210041/http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL
100142005.	  
8	  Executive	  Order	  13492,	  Review	  and	  Disposition	  of	  Individuals	  Detained	  at	  the	  Guantánamo	  
Bay	  Naval	  Base	  and	  Closure	  of	  Detention	  Facilities,	  74	  Fed.	  Reg.	  4897	  (Jan.	  22,	  2009),	  available	  
at	  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-­‐2009-­‐01-­‐27/pdf/E9-­‐1893.pdf.	  
9	  Charlie	  Savage,	  Detainees	  Will	  Still	  Be	  Held,	  but	  Not	  Tried,	  Official	  Says,	  N.Y.	  TIMES	  (Jan.	  22,	  
2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22gitmo.html.	  	  
10	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union,	  Guantánamo	  by	  the	  Numbers	  (updated	  Dec.	  27,	  2012),	  
available	  at	  http://www.aclu.org/national-­‐security/Guantánamo-­‐numbers.	  
11	  United	  States	  v.	  Khadr,	  Charges,	  ¶¶	  12,	  20,	  available	  at	  
http://www.defense.gov/news/nov2005/d20051104khadr.pdf.	  
2013]	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the	   U.S.	   military	   commissions	   system	   with	   conspiracy,	   murder	   by	   an	  
unprivileged	  belligerent,	  attempted	  murder	  by	  an	  unprivileged	  belligerent,	  and	  
aiding	  the	  enemy.12	  	  
	   The	  U.S.	  government	  alleged	  that	  when	  Khadr	  was	  only	  10	  years	  old,	  he	  
and	  his	  father	  maintained	  close,	  continuous	  contact	  with	  Usama	  bin	  Laden	  and	  
other	   senior	   members	   of	   al	   Qaida,	   a	   non-­‐State	   armed	   terrorist	   organization	  
with	   deeply-­‐held	  Muslim	   beliefs.13	   	   They	   visited	   al	  Qaida	   training	   camps	   and	  
guesthouses,14	  and	  even	  made	  yearly	  trips	  to	  Jalalabad	  to	  visit	  bin	  Laden.15	  	  For	  
these	   reasons,	   al	   Qaida	   operatives	   likely	   recruited	   and	   indoctrinated	   Omar	  
when	  he	  was	  still	  a	  minor.	  	  His	  family	  continued	  to	  move	  frequently	  throughout	  
Afghanistan.16	   	   In	   the	   summer	  of	   2002,	  Omar	   received	  personalized	   al	  Qaida	  
weapons	   and	   landmines	   training.17	   	   After	   completing	   his	   training,	   Khadr	  
conducted	   surveillance	   and	   reconnaissance	   against	   the	   U.S.	   military.	   	   For	  
example,	   he	   went	   to	   an	   airport	   near	   Khost,	   Afghanistan,	   and	   watched	   U.S.	  
convoys	   in	   support	   of	   future	   attacks.18	   	   	   Shortly	   thereafter,	   he	   planted	  
explosive	   devices	   in	   the	   ground	   where	   U.S.	   forces	   were	   known	   to	   travel.19	  	  
While	   engaged	   in	   a	   firefight	  with	   U.S.	   forces,	   Khadr	   threw	   a	   grenade,	   killing	  
Sergeant	  First	  Class	  Christopher	  Speer.20	  	  
	  
III.	  	  STATUS	  REVIEW	  
	  
A. 	  	  	  	  	  	  Overview	  
	  
	   In	  2004,	  before	  any	  formal	  charges	  were	  filed,	  Khadr’s	  combatant	  status	  
was	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Combatant	  Status	  Review	  Tribunal	  (“CSRT”).21	   	  The	  CSRT	  
concluded,	  by	  a	  preponderance	  of	  the	  evidence,	  that:	  Khadr	  was	  mentally	  and	  
physically	   capable	   of	   participating	   in	   the	   proceedings;	   he	   understood	   the	  
proceedings	  but	  chose	  not	  to	  participate;	  and	  that	  he	  was	  properly	  classified	  as	  
an	   enemy	   combatant.22	   	   The	   CSRT	   defined	   an	   enemy	   combatant	   as	   “an	  
individual	   who	   was	   part	   of	   or	   supporting	   the	   Taliban	   or	   al	   Qaida	   forces,	   or	  
associated	  forces	  that	  are	  engaged	  in	  hostilities	  against	  the	  United	  States	  or	  its	  
                                                
12	  Id.	  at	  ¶¶	  21ff.	  
13	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  16.	  
14	  Id.	  
15	  Id.	  
16	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  17.	  
17	  Id.	  at	  ¶¶	  22(a),	  22(c).	  
18	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  22(b).	  
19	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  22(d).	  
20	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  22(e).	  
21	  Review	  of	  Combatant	  Status	  Review	  Tribunal	  No.	  5,	  Khadr	  v.	  Bush,	  587	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  225,	  
available	  at	  http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-­‐guantanamo-­‐testimonials-­‐
project/testimonies/testimonies-­‐of-­‐the-­‐defense-­‐department/csrts/csrt_isn_766.pdf.	  
22	  Id.	  at	  10.	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coalition	  partners.	   	  This	   includes	  any	  person	  who	  committed	  a	  belligerent	  act	  
or	   has	   directly	   supported	   hostilities	   in	   aid	   of	   enemy	   armed	   forces.”23	   	   Even	  
after	   the	   military	   commissions	   system	   was	   invalidated	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Supreme	  
Court,24	   the	   CSRT’s	   definition	   remained	   consistent	   with	   the	   definitions	  
provided	  in	  the	  Military	  Commissions	  Act	  of	  200625	  (“2006	  MCA”)	  and	  its	  2009	  
amendment26	   (“MCA	  Amendment”)	   (together,	   “MCA”).	   	   Based	   on	   the	  MCA’s	  
distinction	  between	  “lawful”	  and	  “unlawful”	  enemy	  combatants,27	  Khadr	  was	  
charged	  as	  the	  latter––without	  regard	  to	  his	  age––and	  remained	  in	  custody	  at	  
Guantánamo.	  	  
	  
B. 	  	  	  	  	  Khadr	  as	  Child	  Soldier	  
	  
Because	  of	  his	  age	  and	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  alleged	  offenses,	  
Khadr	  should	  have	  been	  classified	  as	  a	  child	  soldier.	  	  The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  
Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  (“CRC”)	  defines	  a	  child	  as	  “every	  human	  being	  below	  the	  age	  
of	   eighteen	   years.”28	   	   The	   United	   Nations	   Children’s	   Fund	   further	   defines	   a	  
“child	  soldier”	  as	  “any	  child	  .	   .	   .	  who	  is	  part	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  regular	  or	  irregular	  
armed	   force	   or	   armed	   group	   in	   any	   capacity,	   including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to:	  
cooks,	  porters,	  messengers,	  and	  anyone	  accompanying	  such	  groups	  other	  than	  
family	  members.	  	  It	  includes	  girls	  and	  boys	  recruited	  for	  forced	  sexual	  purposes	  
and/or	   forced	  marriage.	   	   The	   definition,	   therefore,	   does	   not	   only	   refer	   to	   a	  
child	  who	   is	   carrying,	  or	  has	  carried,	  weapons.”29	   	  This	   is	  an	  enhanced	  status	  
that	   could	   have	   justified	   Khadr’s	   release,	   and	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   would	   have	  
afforded	  him	  greater	   protections	   under	   international	   law	   (see	   Part	   IV,	   infra).	  	  
Various	  legal	  and	  policy	  reasons	  support	  such	  a	  classification.	  	  
	  
i. 	  	  	  Legal	  Justifications	  
	  
a. International	  Instruments	  
	  
The	   overwhelming	   accumulation	   of	   international	   treaty	   law	   and	   State	  
practice	  confirms	  the	  unique	  vulnerability	  of	  children,	  especially	  child	  soldiers.	  	  
The	  1924	  Geneva	  Declaration	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  modern	  children’s	  rights,	  
                                                
23	  Id.	  at	  13.	  
24	  See	  Hamdan	  v.	  Rumsfeld,	  548	  U.S.	  557,	  634	  (2006)	  [hereinafter	  Hamdan].	  
25	  See	  10	  USC	  §	  948(a),	  Military	  Commissions	  Act	  [hereinafter	  2006	  MCA],	  available	  at	  
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C47A.txt.	  
26	  See	  id.	  (as	  amended)	  [hereinafter	  MCA	  Amendment].	  
27	  See	  2006	  MCA	  and	  MCA	  Amendment,	  supra	  notes	  25	  and	  26	  [hereinafter	  “MCA”].	  
28	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child,	  G.A.	  Res.	  44/25,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/44/49	  (Nov.	  20,	  1989)	  
[hereinafter	  CRC],	  available	  at	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx.	  	  
29	  UNICEF	  Factsheet,	  available	  at	  http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf;	  
Factsheet	  based	  on	  the	  Cape	  Town	  Principles	  (1997),	  available	  at	  
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf.	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stating,	   inter	   alia,	   that	   they	   “must	   be	   protected	   against	   every	   form	   of	  
exploitation.”30	   	  The	  1959	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	   the	  Child	  expanded	  on	  
that	   principle,	   adding	   that	   the	   child,	   “by	   reason	   of	   his	   physical	   and	   mental	  
immaturity,	   needs	   special	   safeguards	   and	   care,	   including	   appropriate	   legal	  
protection.”31	   	   The	   CRC,	   adopted	   in	   1989,	   emphasizes	   the	   principles	   of	   non-­‐
discrimination,	   children’s	   participation,	   and	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   child.32	  	  
The	   Millennium	   Declaration	   considers	   children	   to	   be	   among	   the	   “most	  
vulnerable.”33	  	  The	  Declaration	  accordingly	  calls	  upon	  States	  to	  “spare	  no	  effort	  
[to	  give	  them]	  .	  .	  .	  every	  assistance	  and	  protection,”	  and	  to	  that	  end,	  ratify	  and	  
implement	  the	  CRC	  with	  its	  protocols.34	  	  
International	  humanitarian	  law	  extends	  children’s	  protection	  during	  and	  
after	  wartime.	  For	  example,	  many	  provisions	  in	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  (1949)	  
and	  its	  additional	  protocols	  are	  recognized	  as	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  
frequently	   distinguish	   between	   different	   age	   groups.	   	   Within	   Geneva	  
Convention	   III,	  Article	  16	  requires	  that	  age	  be	  taken	   into	  account	   in	  assigning	  
positions,	   while	   Article	   49	   requires	   age	   differentiation	   among	   laborers.35	  	  
Within	   Geneva	   Convention	   IV,	   Article	   24	   outlines	   specific	   provisions	   for	  
children	  under	  15	  years	  old,	  Article	  50	  imposes	  child-­‐specific	  obligations	  upon	  
occupying	   powers,	   Article	   51	   excludes	   children	   under	   18	   years	   old	   from	   any	  
circumstances	   that	  may	   subject	   them	   to	   an	   occupying	   power,	   and	  Article	   68	  
excludes	  children	  from	  the	  death	  penalty	  if	  they	  were	  under	  18	  years	  old	  when	  
the	   alleged	   offense	   was	   committed.36	   	   Article	   77(1)	   of	   Protocol	   I	   further	  
provides	  that	  children	  “shall	  be	  the	  object	  of	  special	  respect”	  and	  that	  Parties	  
to	   the	   conflict	   “shall	   provide	   them	   with	   the	   care	   and	   aid	   they	   require.”37	  	  
Article	  4(3)	  of	  Protocol	   II	  also	  provides	  that	  children	  are	  entitled,	  by	  virtue	  of	  
                                                
30	  Geneva	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  (Sept.	  26,	  1924),	  available	  at	  http://www.un-­‐
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm.	  
31	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child,	  G.A.	  Res.	  1386	  (XIV),	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/4354	  (Dec.	  10,	  1959),	  
available	  at	  
http://www.unicef.org/lac/spbarbados/Legal/global/General/declaration_child1959.pdf.	  
32	  See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  at	  Preamble,	  art.	  1.	  
33	  U.N.	  Millennium	  Declaration,	  G.A.	  Res.	  55/2,	  ¶	  2	  (Sept.	  18,	  2000),	  available	  at	  
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.	  
34	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  26.	  
35	  Geneva	  Convention	  III	  Relative	  to	  the	  Treatment	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War,	  Aug.	  12,	  1949,	  75	  
U.N.T.S.	  135,	  available	  at	  http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375.	  
36	  Geneva	  Convention	  IV	  Relative	  to	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilian	  Persons	  in	  Time	  of	  War,	  Aug.	  12,	  
1949,	  75	  U.N.T.S.	  287,	  available	  at	  http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/380.	  
37	  Additional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  of	  12	  August	  1949,	  and	  relating	  to	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Victims	  of	  International	  Armed	  Conflicts	  (“Protocol	  I”),	  June	  8,	  1977,	  1125	  
U.N.T.S.	  3	  [hereinafter	  Protocol	  I],	  available	  at	  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument.	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their	  age,	  to	  special	  protections.38	  	  
Other	   legal	   instruments	   highlight	   children’s	   vulnerability	   in	   such	  
circumstances.	   	   The	  CRC,	   for	   example,	   contains	   several	   provisions	   relating	   to	  
armed	   conflict.39	   	   States	   Parties	   are	   obliged	   “to	   promote	   physical	   and	  
psychological	   recovery	   and	   social	   reintegration”	   in	   “an	   environment	   which	  
fosters	   the	   health,	   self-­‐respect	   and	   dignity	   of	   the	   child.”40	   	   The	   2005	  World	  
Summit	  Outcome,	   recalling	   the	  Millennium	  Declaration	   principles,	   calls	   upon	  
States	   to	   take	   measures	   preventing	   the	   recruitment	   and	   use	   of	   children	   in	  
armed	   conflict,	   to	   criminalize	   such	   practices,	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	   children	   in	  
armed	   conflicts	   receive	   “timely	   and	   effective	   humanitarian	   assistance,	  
including	  education,	  for	  their	  rehabilitation	  and	  reintegration	  into	  society.”41	  
	  
b. Lack	  of	  Precedent	  
	  
	   Although	   prosecutions	   of	   child	   soldiers	   are	   not	   expressly	   prohibited	  
under	  international	  law,	  no	  international	  criminal	  tribunal	  has	  ever	  prosecuted	  
a	  former	  child	  soldier	  for	  alleged	  war	  crimes.	  	  Some	  tribunals	  that	  have	  limited	  
jurisdiction	   over	   minors	   (discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   below)	   are	   rare	   and	   have	  
never	  exercised	  any	  such	  jurisdiction.	  	  
When	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  ICC	  was	  drafted,	  countries	  made	  varying	  
proposals	  for	  a	  universally	  acceptable	  age	  of	  criminal	  responsibility.	  	  According	  
to	  a	  commentary	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute’s	  drafting	  history,	  no	  one	  under	  18	  years	  
old	   was	   ever	   charged	   with	   any	   crime	   by	   the	   Nuremberg	   courts.42	   	   For	   that	  
reason,	  States	  involved	  in	  the	  statute’s	  drafting	  agreed	  that	  under	  international	  
law	  criminal	   responsibility	  begins	  at	  18	  years	  old.43	   	  Consequently,	   the	  Rome	  
Statute	  now	  reads	  that	  “[t]he	  Court	  shall	  have	  no	  jurisdiction	  over	  any	  person	  
who	   was	   under	   the	   age	   of	   18	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   alleged	   commission	   of	   a	  
crime.”44	   	   In	   exercising	   that	   jurisdiction,	   Luis	   Moreno	   Ocampo,	   an	   ICC	  
prosecutor,	   charged	   Thomas	   Lubanga	   Dyilo	   with	   the	   war	   crimes	   of	   enlisting	  
                                                
38	  Additional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  of	  12	  August	  1949,	  and	  relating	  to	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Victims	  of	  Non-­‐International	  Armed	  Conflicts	  (“Protocol	  II”),	  June	  8,	  1977,	  1125	  
U.N.T.S.	  609	  [hereinafter	  Protocol	  II],	  available	  at	  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/475?opendocument.	  
39	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  38-­‐39.	  
40	  Id.	  at	  art.	  39.	  
41	  2005	  World	  Summit	  Outcome,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/RES/60/1,	  ¶¶	  117-­‐118	  (Oct.	  24,	  2005),	  available	  
at	  http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf.	  
42	  OTTO	  TRIFFTERER,	  ed.,	  COMMENTARY	  ON	  THE	  ROME	  STATUTE	  OF	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  CRIMINAL	  COURT:	  
OBSERVERS’	  NOTES,	  ARTICLE	  BY	  ARTICLE	  494	  (1999).	  
43	  Id.	  
44	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  art.	  26,	  July	  17,	  1998,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  
A/CONF.183/9,	  2187	  U.N.T.S.	  90	  [hereinafter	  Rome	  Statute],	  available	  at	  
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.	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and	   using	   children	   under	   the	   age	   of	   fifteen	   to	   participate	   actively	   in	  
hostilities.45	   	  The	  court	  convicted	  Lubanga	  on	  the	  grounds	   that	  his	   leadership	  
activities	  subjected	  children	  to	  “real	  danger”	  as	  potential	  targets	  of	  violence.46	  
	   The	   UN	   Security	   Council	   established	   the	   Special	   Court	   for	   Sierra	   Leone	  
(“SCSL”)	  to	  prosecute	  “persons	  who	  bear	  the	  greatest	  responsibility”	  for	  crimes	  
committed	  during	  its	  civil	  war,	  particularly	  those	  who	  led	  the	  recruitment	  and	  
exploitation	   of	   child	   soldiers.47	   	   The	   SCSL’s	   statute	   provides	   the	   court	  
jurisdiction	   over	   children	   between	   15-­‐18	   years	   old	   but	   requires	   that	   they	   be	  
treated	  “with	  dignity	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  worth,	  taking	  into	  account	  his	  or	  her	  young	  
age	   and	   the	   desirability	   of	   promoting	   his	   or	   her	   rehabilitation,	   reintegration	  
into	  and	  assumption	  of	  a	  constructive	  role	  in	  society.”48	  	  The	  court	  also	  has	  the	  
power	   to	   order	   juvenile-­‐appropriate	   measures,	   including	   care	   guidance,	  
supervision,	   community	   service,	   counseling,	   foster	   care,	   and	  correctional	   and	  
educational	   programs.49	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	   Security	   Council	   believed	   that	   the	  
Sierra	   Leone	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission	   could	   probably	   serve	   this	  
purpose	  better	  than	  the	  courts.50	  
Other	  ad	  hoc	  tribunals	  have	  taken	  similar	  deliberate	  measures.	  	  Neither	  
statute	  for	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,51	  nor	  
Rwanda,52	   contains	   any	   provisions	   regarding	   the	   minimum	   age	   of	   criminal	  
responsibility.	  	  However,	  should	  the	  courts	  have	  sought	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  
                                                
45	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Lubanga	  Dyilo,	  No.	  ICC-­‐01/04-­‐01/06,	  Warrant	  of	  Arrest	  (Jan.	  12,	  2001),	  
available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.PDF.	  
46	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Lubanga	  Dyilo,	  No.	  ICC-­‐01/04-­‐01/06,	  Judgment,	  ¶	  628	  (Mar.	  14,	  2012)	  
[hereinafter	  Lubanga],	  available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.	  
47	  U.N.	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Letter	  dated	  Jan.	  12,	  2001	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  addressed	  to	  
the	  President	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/2001/40,	  at	  1,	  available	  at	  http://daccess-­‐
dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/211/71/PDF/N0121171.pdf.	  
48	  Statute	  of	  the	  Special	  Court	  for	  Sierra	  Leone	  art.	  7(1),	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/RES/1315	  (Aug.	  14,	  2000)	  
[hereinafter	  SCSL	  Statute],	  available	  at	  http://www.sc-­‐
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw=&.	  
49	  Id.	  at	  art.	  7(2).	  
50	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  President,	  Letter	  dated	  Dec.	  20,	  2000	  from	  the	  President	  of	  the	  
Security	  Council	  addressed	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/2000/1234,	  at	  1,	  available	  at	  
http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/812/77/PDF/N0081277.pdf.	  
51	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Prosecution	  of	  Persons	  Responsible	  for	  Serious	  
Violations	  of	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Committed	  in	  the	  Territory	  of	  the	  Former	  
Yugoslavia	  since	  1991,	  Annex,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/25704	  (May	  3,	  1993),	  available	  at	  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal	  Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf.	  
52	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Prosecution	  of	  Persons	  Responsible	  for	  
Genocide	  and	  Other	  Serious	  Violations	  of	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Committed	  in	  the	  
Territory	  of	  Rwanda	  and	  Rwandan	  Citizens	  Responsible	  for	  Genocide	  and	  Other	  Such	  Violations	  
Committed	  in	  the	  Territory	  of	  Neighboring	  States,	  between	  Jan.	  1,	  1994	  and	  Dec.	  31,	  1994,	  
Annex,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/RES/955	  (1994),	  available	  at	  
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/955(1994).	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over	   a	   minor,	   he	   or	   she	   could	   raise	   age	   as	   an	   affirmative	   defense.53	   	   The	  
Extraordinary	   Chambers	   in	   the	   Courts	   of	   Cambodia	   limit	   their	   jurisdiction	   to	  
“those	  who	  were	  most	   responsible”	   for	  war	   crimes	   during	   the	   Khmer	   Rouge	  
period.54	   	   Should	   a	   court	   decide	   that	   a	   minor	   was	   among	   those	   most	  
responsible,	   however,	   the	   purpose	   of	   any	   prosecution	   would	   still	   be	  
rehabilitative	  rather	  than	  retributive.55	  	  The	  Special	  Panels	  for	  Serious	  Crimes	  in	  
East	   Timor	   may	   prosecute	   minors	   between	   12-­‐16	   years	   old,	   but	   “only	   in	  
accordance	   with	   such	   rules	   as	   may	   be	   established	   in	   subsequent	   [United	  
Nations	   Transitional	   Administration	   in	   East	   Timor]	   regulations	   on	   juvenile	  
justice,”	  which	  must	  accord	  with	  the	  CRC	  and	  “shall	  consider	  his	  or	  her	  juvenile	  
condition	  in	  every	  decision	  made	  in	  the	  case.”56	  	  The	  CRC,	  in	  turn,	  provides	  that	  
measures	  relating	  to	  children	  in	  armed	  conflict	  should	  be	  intended	  to	  promote	  
physical	  and	  psychological	  recovery	  and	  social	  reintegration.57	  
	  
ii. 	  	  Policy	  Justifications	  
	  
a. Developmental	  Vulnerabilities	  
	  
Recent	   social	   science	   research	   confirms	   that	   juveniles	   are	   much	   less	  
capable	   of	   controlling	   their	   behavior,	   and	   therefore	   are	   less	   culpable	   than	  
adults.58	  	  Generally	  speaking,	  juveniles	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  take	  risks	  than	  adults	  
and	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  can	  avoid	  negative	  consequences	  of	  taking	  
                                                
53	  See	  U.N.	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Rep.	  of	  Secretary	  General	  Pursuant	  to	  Paragraph	  2	  of	  S.C.	  Res.	  
808,	  ¶	  58,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/2570	  (1993)	  (stating	  that	  the	  tribunals	  must	  decide	  if	  age	  or	  mental	  
incapacity	  may	  relieve	  a	  person	  of	  individual	  criminal	  responsibility),	  available	  at	  
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal	  Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf.	  
54	  Law	  on	  the	  Extraordinary	  Chambers	  in	  the	  Courts	  of	  Cambodia	  for	  the	  Prosecution	  of	  Crimes	  
Committed	  During	  the	  Period	  of	  Democratic	  Kampuchea	  art.	  1,	  NS/RKM/1004/006,	  available	  at	  
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-­‐
documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.	  
55	  See	  id.	  at	  art.	  33	  (providing	  that	  courts	  shall	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  in	  accordance	  with	  
international	  standards	  .	  .	  .	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  1966	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  
Rights	  [hereinafter	  ICCPR]”),	  see	  also	  ICCPR	  art.	  14(4),	  G.A.	  Res.	  2200A	  (XXI),	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/6316,	  
999	  U.N.T.S.	  171	  (1966)	  (stating	  that	  criminal	  process	  over	  minors	  must	  “take	  account	  of	  their	  
age	  and	  the	  desirability	  of	  promoting	  their	  rehabilitation”).	  
56	  U.N.	  Transitional	  Authority	  in	  East	  Timor	  on	  Transitional	  Rules	  of	  Criminal	  Procedure	  art.	  45,	  
Reg.	  2000/30,	  available	  at	  
http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/UNTAETLaw/Regulations/Reg2000-­‐30.pdf.	  
57	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  39.	  
58	  Roper	  v.	  Simmons,	  543	  U.S.	  551,	  567	  (2005)	  [hereinafter	  Simmons]	  (citing	  Jeffrey	  Arnett,	  
Reckless	  Behavior	  in	  Adolescence:	  A	  Developmental	  Perspective,	  12	  DEV.	  REV.	  339	  (1992);	  
Laurence	  Steinberg	  &	  Elizabeth	  Scott,	  Less	  Guilty	  by	  Reason	  of	  Adolescence:	  Developmental	  
Immaturity,	  Diminished	  Responsibility,	  and	  the	  Juvenile	  Death	  Penalty,	  58	  AM.	  PSYCHOLOGIST	  
1009,	  1014	  (2003);	  ERIK	  ERIKSON,	  IDENTITY:	  YOUTH	  AND	  CRISIS	  (1968)).	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Separate	  But	  Equal	  Accountability	   135	  135	  
such	  risks.59	   	  They	  may	  be	  unaware	  of	  all	  the	  risks	   involved	  or	  fail	  to	  properly	  
calculate	   the	   risks	   involved.	   	   Whether	   due	   to	   their	   young	   age,	   uncertainty	  
about	  the	  future,	  reduced	  stake	  in	  life,	  or	  other	  relevant	  factors,	  they	  also	  tend	  
to	  focus	  more	  on	  short-­‐term	  than	  long-­‐term	  consequences,60	  and	  often	  fail	  to	  
appreciate	  the	  real	  costs	  of	  their	  decisions	  and	  behavior.61	  	  Juveniles	  also	  tend	  
to	  resist	  social	  controls	  and	  deterrence	  measures.62	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   they	   are	   more	   easily	   influenced	   by	   their	  
peers	  and	  by	  how	  they	  perceive	  themselves.63	  	  Peer	  pressure	  can	  play	  a	  major	  
role	   in	   the	   commission	   of	   crimes,	   as	   most	   delinquent	   behavior	   occurs	   in	  
groups.64	   	   Human	   rights	   groups	   similarly	   acknowledge	   that	   children	   are	  
vulnerable	   to	  military	   recruitment	   because	   they	   are	   “easily	  manipulated	   and	  
can	  be	  drawn	  into	  violence	  that	  they	  are	  too	  young	  to	  resist	  or	  understand.”65	  	  
As	  a	  whole,	  juveniles	  have	  less	  control	  over	  their	  environment,	  which	  plays	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  their	  development.66	  
These	  generalities	  apply	  to	  Khadr’s	  case	  because	  senior	  operatives	  of	  al	  
Qaida,	  a	  powerful	  and	  influential	  organization,	  recruited	  and	  trained	  him	  from	  
a	  young	  age.	   	  His	   father	  maintained	  close	  contact	  with	   those	  operatives,	  and	  
may	   have	   encouraged	   or	   even	   compelled	   his	   young	   son	   to	   join	   the	  
organization.	  	  Khadr’s	  family	  was	  always	  on	  the	  move	  during	  an	  unstable	  time	  
in	   Afghanistan’s	   history,	   so	   he	   probably	   lacked	   any	   real	   control	   over	   his	  
environment.	   Khadr	   attended	   numerous	   events	   and	   summer	   camps,	   and	  
probably	   associated	   with	   other	   boys	   his	   age,	   so	   these	   people	   exerted	   a	  
considerable	  amount	  of	  influence	  on	  him	  over	  time.	  	  Thus	  Khadr	  seems	  to	  have	  
joined	   and	   remained	   in	   the	   organization	   for	   social,	   political,	   and	   perhaps	   to	  
                                                
59	  Elizabeth	  Cauffman	  &	  Laurence	  Steinberg,	  (Im)maturity	  of	  Judgment	  in	  Adolescence:	  Why	  
Adolescents	  May	  Be	  Less	  Culpable	  Than	  Adults,	  18	  BEHAV.	  SCI.	  &	  L.	  741,	  752	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some	  degree,	  economic	  stability.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
b. Rehabilitation	  Capacity	  
	  
Recent	   social	   research	   also	   suggests	   that	   children	   generally	   have	   a	  
greater	   capacity	   to	   rehabilitate	   than	   adults.67	   	   In	  Roper	   v.	   Simmons,	   the	  U.S.	  
Supreme	  Court	  recognized	  that	  because	  juveniles	  “still	  struggle	  to	  define	  their	  
identity[,]	   .	   .	   .	   the	  signature	  qualities	  of	  youth	  are	   transient.”68	   	  Therefore,	   in	  
the	  Court’s	  view,	  “it	  would	  be	  misguided	  to	  equate	  the	  failings	  of	  a	  minor	  with	  
those	   of	   an	   adult,	   for	   a	   greater	   possibility	   exists	   that	   a	   minor’s	   character	  
deficiencies	  will	  be	  reformed.	  .	   .	   .	   	   [T]he	  impetuousness	  and	  recklessness	  that	  
may	   dominate	   in	   younger	   years	   can	   subside.”69	   	   Given	   Khadr’s	   capacity	   to	  
rehabilitate,	  it	  was	  improper	  for	  the	  military	  commission	  to	  classify	  Khadr	  as	  an	  
enemy	  combatant	  rather	  than	  a	  child	  soldier.	  
	  
IV.	  	  CONSEQUENCES	  
	  
A. 	  	  	  Denial	  of	  Special	  Protections	  
	  
International	   law	   requires	   that	   all	   children	   receive	   special	   rights	   and	  
protections	   during	   and	   after	   wartime,	   including	   those	   accused	   of	   having	  
unlawfully	   engaged	   in	  wartime	   activities.	   	   International	   law	   severely	   restricts	  
the	  recruitment	  and	  use	  of	  child	  soldiers,	  and	  in	  fact,	  may	  be	  moving	  towards	  
abolishing	  their	  recruitment	  and	  use	  altogether.70	  	  The	  recruitment	  and	  use	  of	  
all	  children	  under	  15	  years	  old	  to	  actively	  participate	  in	  hostilities	  is	  prohibited,	  
as	   well	   as	   the	   forced	   or	   compulsory	   recruitment	   of	   children	   between	   15-­‐18	  
years	  old.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  latter	  join	  State	  armed	  forces	  voluntarily,	  they	  may	  not	  
participate	  directly	   in	  hostilities;	   and,	   furthermore,	   international	   law	   imposes	  
strict	  criteria	  to	  ensure	  that	  children	  give	  informed	  consent.	  	  Any	  enlistment	  in	  
non-­‐State	   armed	   groups	   is	   prohibited	   per	   se.	   	   As	   discussed	   in	   Part	   III,	  
international	  law	  generally	  precludes	  the	  prosecution	  of	  child	  soldiers	  unless	  it	  
serves	  a	  rehabilitative	  function.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  child	  soldiers	  who	  
have	   been	   unlawfully	   recruited	   and	  who	   should	   be	   viewed	   as	   victims	   of	   the	  
conflict.	  	  Accordingly,	  their	  rehabilitation	  and	  reintegration	  into	  society	  should	  
be	  any	  court’s	  primary	  concern.	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i.	   Presumption	  of	  Victimization	  
	  
The	   prohibition	   of	   the	   recruitment	   and	   use	   of	   children	   under	   15	   to	  
participate	   actively	   in	   hostilities	   is	   enshrined	   in	   treaty	   law	   as	   a	   rule	   of	  
customary	  international	  law,	  and	  thus	  binding	  on	  the	  U.S.71	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Geneva	  
Protocols	   influenced	   the	  drafting	  of	   the	  CRC	  because	  most	   State	  participants	  
viewed	  their	  provisions	  as	  reflecting	  customary	  international	  law.72	  	  Article	  77	  
of	   Protocol	   I	   prohibits	   the	   recruitment	   of	   children	   under	   15	   years	   old	   into	  
armed	  forces	  and	  their	  direct	  participation	  in	  hostilities	  in	  international	  armed	  
conflicts.73	   	   Similarly,	   Article	   4(3)	   of	   Protocol	   II	   prohibits	   the	   recruitment	   of	  
children	  under	  15	  years	  old	  into	  armed	  forces	  and	  their	  direct	  participation	  in	  
non-­‐international	   armed	   conflicts.74	   	   Article	   38(2)	   of	   the	   CRC,	   following	   suit,	  
requires	  States	  Parties	  to	  ensure	  that	  persons	  who	  have	  not	  attained	  the	  age	  of	  
fifteen	  years	  do	  not	   take	  a	  direct	  part	   in	  hostilities,	  and	  Article	  38(3)	   likewise	  
obliges	   States	   Parties	   to	   refrain	   from	   recruiting	   any	   person	   who	   has	   not	  
attained	  the	  age	  of	  fifteen	  years	  into	  their	  armed	  forces.75	  	  Both	  Protocol	  I	  and	  
the	  CRC	  require	  that	  in	  recruiting	  among	  children	  who	  have	  attained	  the	  age	  of	  
15,	   but	   who	   have	   not	   yet	   attained	   the	   age	   of	   18,	   States	   Parties	   shall	   give	  
priority	  to	  those	  who	  are	  oldest.76	  
For	  children	  between	  15-­‐18	  years	  old,	  the	  Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  CRC	  
on	   the	   Involvement	   of	   Children	   in	   Armed	   Conflict	   (“OPCRC”)	   requires	   States	  
Parties	   to	   maintain	   minimum	   safeguards	   that	   ensure	   such	   recruitment	   is	  
genuinely	  voluntary	  and	  is	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  child’s	  
parents	  or	  guardians.77	   	   It	  also	  requires	  that	  such	  persons	  be	   informed	  of	  the	  
duties	   involved	   and	   that	   they	   provide	   reliable	   proof	   of	   age	   prior	   to	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  U.S.	  was	  unwilling	  to	  ratify	  Protocol	  I,	  it	  viewed	  
many	  provisions	  as	  reflecting	  customary	  international	  law,	  including	  the	  principle	  that	  children	  
under	  fifteen	  should	  not	  take	  a	  direct	  part	  in	  hostilities).	  
73	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enlistment.78	   	   All	   recruitment	   of	   child	   soldiers	   by	   non-­‐State	   armed	   groups	   is	  
presumed	  to	  be	  involuntary,	  and	  thus	  illegal.	  	  Non-­‐State	  groups	  are	  prohibited	  
from	   recruiting	   or	   using	   children	   under	   18	   years	   old	   “under	   any	  
circumstances.”79	  	  Of	  course,	  non-­‐State	  groups	  cannot	  be	  parties	  to	  the	  OPCRC,	  
so	  only	  States	  can	  monitor	  their	  activities.	  	  For	  that	  reason,	  Article	  4(2)	  requires	  
that	  States	  Parties	  take	  “all	  feasible	  measures	  to	  prevent	  such	  recruitment	  and	  
use,	   including	   the	   adoption	   of	   legal	   measures	   necessary	   to	   prohibit	   and	  
criminalize	  such	  practices.”80	  	  The	  U.S.	  is	  one	  of	  many	  countries	  bound	  by	  this	  
treaty.81	  
Unlawfully	   recruited	   children	   should	   be	   presumed	   victims	   of	   human	  
rights	  violations,	  and	  possibly	  even	  as	  victims	  of	  war	  crimes.	  	  Many	  children	  are	  
drugged,	  coerced,	  sexually	  exploited,	  and/or	  forced	  to	  commit	  atrocities	  during	  
and	  after	  their	  recruitment.82	   	  The	   International	  Labor	  Organization	  considers	  
the	   forced	   or	   compulsory	   recruitment	   of	   children	   for	   armed	   conflict	   to	   be	   a	  
form	  of	  modern	  slavery.83	  	  Article	  8(2)	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  lists	  conscripting	  or	  
enlisting	   children	   under	   15	   years	   old	   into	   armed	   forces	   or	   using	   them	   to	  
participate	   actively	   in	   conflicts	   as	   war	   crimes	   within	   the	   ICC’s	   jurisdiction.84	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   Rome	   Statute	   was	   selectively	   incorporated	   into	   the	   SCSL	  
Statute,85	   under	   which	   several	   persons	   were	   prosecuted	   for	   unlawfully	  
recruiting	  child	  soldiers.86	   	   In	  the	  Lubanga	  case,	  the	  SCSL	  noted	  that	  unlawful	  
conscription	   and	   enlistment	   are	   continuous	   in	   nature	   and	   only	   end	   when	  
children	  reach	  the	  age	  of	  fifteen	  or	  leave	  the	  armed	  group.87	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  v.	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  2007)	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  defendants	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  Prosecutor	  v.	  Fofana	  and	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Judgment,	  SCSL-­‐04-­‐14-­‐T	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  2,	  2007)	  (finding	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  defendant	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recruitment),	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  http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx.	  
87	  Lubanga,	  supra	  note	  47,	  at	  ¶	  618	  (citing	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Nahimana,	  Appeals	  Judgment,	  ¶	  721,	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Separate	  But	  Equal	  Accountability	   139	  139	  
ii.	   Rehabilitation	  and	  Reintegration	  
	  
	   If	  a	  criminal	  tribunal	  seeks	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  minor,	  it	  should	  
view	   the	   child	   as	   a	   victim	   and	   do	   so	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   rehabilitating	   and	  
reintegrating	   the	  child.	   	  The	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  on	  Children	  Associated	  
with	   Armed	   Forces	   or	   Armed	   Groups	   (the	   Paris	   Principles)	   state	   that	   “at	   all	  
stages,”	  the	  objective	  of	  programming	  should	  be	  to	  enable	  children	  “to	  play	  an	  
active	  role	  as	  a	  civilian	  member	  of	  society,	  integrated	  into	  the	  community	  and,	  
where	   possible,	   reconciled	   with	   her/his	   family.”88	   	   The	   CRC	   obliges	   States	  
Parties	   to	   “take	   all	   appropriate	   measures	   to	   promote	   physical	   and	  
psychological	   recovery	   and	   social	   reintegration”	   of	   neglected,	   exploited,	  
tortured,	   or	   abused	   children.89	   	   Such	   recovery	   and	   reintegration	   should	   take	  
place	   in	   an	   environment	  which	   fosters	   their	   health,	   self-­‐respect,	   and	   human	  
dignity.90	   	   The	   OPCRC	   further	   obliges	   States	   Parties	   to	   “take	   all	   feasible	  
measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  persons…are	  demobilized	  or	  otherwise	  released	  
from	   service…[and]	  when	   necessary,	   [provide]	   all	   appropriate	   assistance”	   for	  
their	  recovery	  and	  reintegration.91	  
The	   US	   ratified	   the	   OPCRC	   in	   December	   200292	   and	   has	   continuously	  
recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  rehabilitative	  programs.	  	  An	  OPCRC	  report	  noted	  
that	   the	   US	   contributed	   “substantial	   resources”	   to	   international	   programs	  
aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  recruitment	  of	  children	  and	  reintegrating	  child	  soldiers	  
into	   society	   and	   “is	   committed	   to	   continue	   to	   develop	   rehabilitation	  
approaches	   that	   are	   effective	   in	   addressing	   this	   serious	   and	   difficult	  
problem.”93	   	   Specifically,	   the	   US	   noted	   that	   it	   contributed	   over	   $10	   million	  
towards	  the	  demobilization	  of	  child	  soldiers	  and	  their	  reintegration	   in	  several	  
countries,	   including	   Afghanistan.94	   	   These	   facts	   make	   Khadr’s	   seemingly	  
retributive	  proceedings	  all	  the	  more	  surprising.	  	  
	  
iii.	  	  Immunity	  from	  Continuing	  Prosecution	  
	  
As	  discussed	   in	  Part	   III,	   infra,	  children	  are	   less	  culpable	  for	  their	  actions	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due	   to	   their	   immaturity	   and	   decision-­‐making.	   	   A	   person	   cannot,	   and	   should	  
not,	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  a	  crime	  if	  he	  or	  she	  was	  not	  fully	  responsible	  at	  the	  
time	   he	   or	   she	   committed	   it.	   	   This	   notion	   was	   deliberately	   reflected	   in	   the	  
drafting	   of	   the	   SCSL’s	   statute,	   which	   protects	   all	   persons	   who	   committed	  
crimes	  when	  they	  were	  children,	   regardless	  of	   their	  age	  when	  they	  appeared	  
before	  the	  court.95	  	  Consequently,	  a	  defendant	  who	  is	  now	  an	  adult	  but	  was	  a	  
child	   soldier	   at	   the	   time	   he	   or	   she	   allegedly	   committed	   war	   crimes	   should	  
receive	  the	  same	  international	  protections	  as	  accused	  child	  soldiers.	  
	  
B. 	  	  	  	  Denial	  of	  Substantive	  Rights	  and	  Procedural	  Safeguards	  
	  
	   Prosecutions	   of	   minors	   should	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   last	   resort,96	   and	   any	  
prosecutions	   should	   comply	   with	   international	   juvenile	   standards.97	   	   (Of	  
course,	   any	   minimum	   child-­‐specific	   standards	   are	   in	   addition	   to	   safeguards	  
guaranteed	  to	  all	  similarly	  situated	  defendants	  under	  international	  law.)	  	  Yet,	  in	  
Khadr’s	   case	   the	  U.S.	   government	   continued	   to	   try	   restricting	  his	   substantive	  
rights	  and	  procedural	  safeguards.	  	  It	  is	  disturbing	  to	  consider	  the	  prospect	  that	  
for	  many	  years	  Khadr	  was	  unable	   to	  exercise	  his	   fundamental	   rights	  and	  was	  
arguably	  subjected	  to	  a	  “kangaroo	  court.”	  
	  
i.	  	  Habeas	  Petitions	  
	  
	   Initially,	  President	  Bush’s	  military	  order	   specified	   that	  detainees	   subject	  
to	  it	  would	  have	  no	  access	  to	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  court	  system	  to	  appeal	  a	  verdict	  
or	   obtain	   any	   other	   relief.98	   	   The	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court	   later	   invalidated	   this	  
order.99	   	   In	   response,	   Congress	   enacted	   the	  Detainee	  Treatment	  Act	   of	   2005	  
(“DTA”).	  The	  DTA	  revoked	  all	  federal	  jurisdiction	  over	  habeas	  claims	  by	  persons	  
detained	  as	  “enemy	  combatants,”	  creating	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  
for	  the	  DC	  Circuit	  to	  hear	  appeals	  of	  final	  decisions	  of	  military	  commissions.100	  	  
The	  US	   Supreme	   Court	   again	   invalidated	   the	  military	   commissions	   system	   in	  
the	   Hamdan	   case,	   holding	   that	   the	   commissions	   were	   required	   to	   follow	  
procedural	  rules	  under	  the	  Uniform	  Code	  of	  Military	  Justice.101	  	  
	   Congress	   then	   passed	   the	   2006	   MCA,	   which	   attempted	   to	   strip	   the	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  dated	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  available	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http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-­‐111301.htm.	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  466,	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judiciary	   of	   habeas	   jurisdiction	   in	   all	   cases	   brought	   by	   detainees,	   including	  
pending	   cases.102	   	   The	   2006	   MCA	   also	   provided	   that,	   “[n]o	   alien	   unlawful	  
enemy	  combatant	  subject	   to	  trial	  by	  military	  commission	   .	   .	   .	  may	   invoke	  the	  
Geneva	   Conventions	   as	   a	   source	   of	   rights.”103	   	   Moreover,	   the	   2006	   MCA	  
explicitly	  authorized	   the	  President	   to	  determine	   the	  meaning	  and	  application	  
of	   the	   Geneva	   Conventions.104	   	   The	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court	   again	   held	   that	  
Congress’s	  actions	  were	  unconstitutional.105	  	  As	  Justice	  Kennedy	  explained,	  the	  
Act	   undermined	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   effectively	   prevented	   the	   judiciary	   from	  
interpreting	   and	   applying	   the	   law:	   “Trial	   by	   military	   commission	   raises	  
separation-­‐of-­‐powers	   concerns	   of	   the	   highest	   order.	   	   Located	  within	   a	   single	  
branch,	   these	   courts	   carry	   the	   risk	   that	  offenses	  will	   be	  defined,	  prosecuted,	  
and	   adjudicated	   by	   executive	   officials	   without	   independent	   review.”106	   	   The	  
denial	   of	   any	   possibility	   of	   habeas	   relief	   contravened	   Khadr’s	   rights	   to	  
challenge	   his	   detention	   before	   a	   court	   or	   other	   competent	   and	   independent	  
authority,	  and	  to	  a	  prompt	  decision	  on	  any	  such	  action.107	  
	  
ii.	  	  	  Assistance	  of	  Counsel	  
	  
	   Under	   the	   CRC,	   every	   child	   deprived	   of	   his	   or	   her	   liberty	   is	   entitled	   to	  
prompt	   access	   to	   legal	   and	   other	   appropriate	   assistance.108	   	   Khadr	   did	   not	  
receive	   access	   to	   legal	   counsel	   until	   more	   than	   two	   years	   after	   he	   was	  
transferred	   to	   Guantánamo.109	   	   The	   2006	  MCA	   also	   restricted	   a	   defendant’s	  
right	  to	  choose	  his	  own	  attorney.	  	  Detainees	  could	  only	  be	  represented	  by	  U.S.	  
civilian	   attorneys	   and	   their	   assigned	   military	   defense	   attorney.110	   	   Many	  
detainees	   such	   as	   Khadr	   are	   likely	   suspicious	   of	   U.S.	   attorneys	   and	   would	  
rather	   be	   represented	   by	   counsel	   from	   their	   home	   country.	   	   Also,	   the	   2006	  
MCA	  only	  provided	  a	   right	   to	  counsel	  after	   the	  swearing	  of	  charges,111	  which	  
meant	   that	   the	  U.S.	   government	   could	   delay	   charging	   a	   detainee	   to	   conduct	  
interrogations	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   counsel.	   	   Finally,	   defense	   counsel	   was	  
restricted	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  see	  and	  discuss	  certain	  information	  with	  its	  clients.112	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work/law-­‐and-­‐security/military-­‐commissions/cases/omar-­‐ahmed-­‐khadr/.	  
110	  2006	  MCA,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  §	  949c(b)(3-­‐5).	  
111	  Id.	  at	  §	  948k.	  
112	  Id.	  at	  §	  949p-­‐4(a-­‐b).	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   Under	   the	   2006	  MCA,	   confessions	   or	   other	   statements	   of	   the	   accused	  
elicited	   through	   coercion,	   compulsory	   self-­‐incrimination,	   or	   any	   cruel,	  
inhuman,	   or	   degrading	   treatment	   could	   be	   admissible	   at	   trial,113	   without	  
Miranda	   warnings	   being	   provided	   first.114	   	   The	   statements’	   admissibility	  
depended	  on	  when	  they	  were	  made.	   	  Prior	  to	  the	  DTA’s	  enactment,	  coercion	  
that	   did	   not	   amount	   to	   torture	   was	   admissible	   if	   (1)	   under	   the	   “totality	   of	  
circumstances”	   under	   which	   any	   statements	   were	   made,	   they	   were	   reliable	  
and	  had	  sufficient	  probative	  value;	  and	  (2)	  “the	  interests	  of	   justice”	  would	  be	  
served	   by	   their	   admission.115	   	   After	   the	   DTA’s	   enactment,	   such	   statements	  
were	   admissible	   if	   the	   interrogation	   methods	   used	   to	   obtain	   them	   did	   not	  
violate	   the	   cruel	   or	   unusual	   punishment	   amendments	   to	   the	   U.S.	  
Constitution.116	   	   Enhanced	   interrogation	   techniques	   such	   as	   waterboarding	  
were	  not	  expressly	  barred,	  which	  plainly	  ignored	  the	  international	  prohibition	  
on	  such	  techniques.	  	  
	   The	   MCA’s	   allowances	   are	   especially	   significant	   in	   light	   of	   juvenile	  
propensity	  to	  give	  false	  confessions.	  	  Various	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  juveniles	  
do	   not	   understand	   or	   appreciate	   Miranda	   warnings	   as	   well	   as	   adults.117	  	  
Children	   may	   also	   comply	   with	   interrogators’	   demands	   due	   to	   their	  
vulnerability	   and	   societal	   expectations	   that	   they	   respect	   authority.118	   	   Khadr	  
claimed	   that	   he	   was	   subjected	   to	   many	   enhanced	   interrogations	   without	  
forewarning,	   and	   that	  he	  would	  often	  give	   false	   responses	   if	  he	  believed	   the	  




	   Under	   the	  MCA,	   classified	   information	   is	   protected	   during	   all	   stages	   of	  
proceedings	   and	   privileged	   from	   disclosure	   for	   purported	   national	   security	  
                                                
113	  Id.	  at	  §	  949a(b)(2)(C).	  
114	  Id.	  at	  §	  948b(d).	  
115	  Id.	  at	  §	  948r.	  
116	  Id.	  
117	  See,	  e.g.,	  Thomas	  Grisso,	  Juveniles’	  Capacities	  to	  Waive	  Miranda	  Warnings:	  An	  Empirical	  
Analysis,	  68	  CALIF.	  L.	  REV.	  1134,	  1166	  (1980).	  
118	  See	  Barry	  Feld,	  Competence,	  Culpability,	  and	  Punishment:	  Implications	  of	  Atkins	  for	  
Executing	  and	  Sentencing	  Adolescents,	  32	  HOFSTRA	  L.	  REV.	  463,	  532	  (2003);	  see	  also	  Gerald	  
Robin,	  Juvenile	  Interrogation	  and	  Confessions,	  10	  J.	  POL.	  SCI.	  &	  ADMIN.	  224,	  225	  (1982).	  
119	  Omar	  Khadr,	  Affidavit	  of	  Omar	  Ahmed	  Khadr	  (Feb.	  22,	  2008)	  [hereinafter	  Affidavit],	  
available	  at	  http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-­‐guantanamo-­‐testimonials-­‐
project/testimonies/prisoner-­‐testimonies/omar_khadr_affidavit	  _22_feb_08.pdf.	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concerns.120	   	   It	   is	   thus	   difficult	   for	   defendants	   to	   challenge	   certain	   evidence,	  
because	   they	   may	   be	   denied	   access	   to	   information	   necessary	   to	   make	   the	  
challenge.	   	   For	   example,	   though	   hearsay	   could	   be	   excluded	   under	   the	   2006	  
MCA,	   the	   burden	   was	   on	   the	   defendant	   to	   clearly	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
evidence	   was	   unreliable	   or	   lacking	   in	   probative	   value.121	   	   But	   to	   test	   its	  
reliability,	  defendants	  would	  have	  needed	  access	  to	  the	  sources,	  methods,	  or	  
activities	   by	   which	   the	   information	   was	   obtained.	   	   Due	   to	   the	   nature	   of	  
defendants’	   confinement	   and	   limited	   access	   to	   attorneys,	   conducting	   proper	  
investigations	  has	  been	  rather	  difficult.	  	  
	   If	  certain	  information	  is	  deemed	  classified,	  then	  documents	  given	  to	  the	  
accused	  are	  redacted	  or	  substituted.	  	  Some	  documents	  are	  not	  provided	  to	  the	  
accused	   at	   all.	   	   The	  military	   judge	  must	   consider	   any	   claim	   of	   privilege	   and	  
review	   supporting	  materials	   in	   camera,	   and	   is	   forbidden	   from	   disclosing	   the	  
privileged	  information.122	  	  The	  MCA	  does	  not	  explicitly	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  
for	  the	  accused	  to	  contest	  the	  admissibility	  of	  substitute	  evidence,	  nor	  does	  it	  
seem	   to	   allow	   the	   accused	   or	   defense	   counsel	   to	   examine	   the	   proffered	  
evidence	  prior	  to	  its	  presentation	  to	  the	  commission.	  
	  
C. 	  	  	  Unlawful	  Detention	  
	  
	   International	   law	  requires	  that	  any	  juvenile	  detention	  be	  an	  exceptional	  
measure	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   needs	   of	   persons	   his	   or	   her	   age.123	  	  
Specifically,	   the	   International	   Committee	   for	   the	   Red	   Cross	   (“ICRC”)	   urges	  
authorities	   to	   take	   the	   following	   measures	   regarding	   detained	   children:	  
administer	  questioning	  without	  delay;	  detain	  the	  children	  in	  quarters	  separate	  
from	   adults;	   for	   extended	   detention,	   transfer	   child	   detainees	   to	   institutions	  
that	  specialize	  in	  care	  for	  minors;	  provide	  food,	  hygiene,	  and	  medical	  care	  that	  
is	  suitable	  to	  the	  age	  and	  condition	  of	  each	  child;	  allow	  them	  to	  spend	  most	  of	  
their	   time	   outdoors;	   allow	   them	   to	   continue	   their	   education;	   and	   ensure	  
regular	  contact	  with	  their	  families.124	  	  The	  facts	  of	  Khadr’s	  case	  clearly	  indicate	  
that	  he	  was	  subjected	  to	  unlawful	  detention,	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  its	  duration	  and	  
conditions.	  	  	  
	  
                                                
120	  See	  MCA,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  §	  948a(4)	  (defining	  “classified	  information”	  as	  “[a]ny	  
information	  or	  material	  that	  has	  been	  determined	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  pursuant	  
to	  statute,	  Executive	  order,	  or	  regulation	  to	  require	  protection	  against	  unauthorized	  disclosure	  
for	  reasons	  of	  national	  security”	  and	  “restricted	  data,	  as	  that	  term	  is	  defined	  in	  section	  11y	  of	  
the	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act	  of	  1954	  (42	  U.S.C.	  2014(y))”).	  
121	  2006	  MCA,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  §	  949a(b)(2)(E).	  
122	  Id.	  at	  §	  949d(f)(3).	  
123	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  37.	  
124	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (“ICRC”),	  Children	  in	  War	  14	  (Nov.	  2009),	  
available	  at	  http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_4015.pdf.	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i.	  	  Duration	  
	  
	   Under	   the	   MCA,	   detainees	   do	   not	   have	   the	   right	   to	   a	   speedy	   trial;125	  
however,	  several	   international	   instruments	  contradict	   that	  position.	   	  The	  CRC	  
provides	   that	   juvenile	  detention	  shall	  be	  “for	   the	  shortest	  appropriate	  period	  
of	  time,”126	  and	  that	  juvenile	  cases	  shall	  be	  heard	  “without	  delay.”127	  	  Similarly,	  
the	   ICCPR	   states	   that	   juveniles	   shall	   be	   brought	   “as	   speedily	   as	   possible”	   for	  
adjudication.128	  	  Khadr	  was	  detained	  for	  over	  two	  years	  before	  he	  was	  formally	  
charged.129	  	  By	  the	  time	  of	  his	  plea	  agreement,	  he	  had	  been	  detained	  for	  over	  
eight	  years	  (see	  Part	  V,	  infra).	  
	  
ii.	  	  Conditions	  
	  
a. Minimum	  Standards	  
	  
	   The	  ICCPR,	  which	  the	  U.S.	  has	  ratified,130	  prohibits	  any	  cruel,	  inhuman,	  or	  
degrading	  treatment,131	  and	  requires	  that	  detainees	  be	  treated	  “with	  humanity	  
and	  respect	  for	  [their]	   inherent	  dignity.”132	   	  Common	  Article	  III	  of	  the	  Geneva	  
Conventions,	   which	   is	   recognized	   as	   customary	   international	   law,	   similarly	  
provides	   safeguards	   against	   cruel	   treatment,	   torture,	   and	   “outrages	   upon	  
personal	  dignity,	  in	  particular,	  humiliating	  and	  degrading	  treatment.”133	  	  It	  also	  
states	  that	  the	  “wounded	  and	  sick	  shall	  be	  collected	  and	  cared	  for.”134	   	  Khadr	  
stated	  that	  he	  was	  badly	  wounded	  in	  the	  firefight	  with	  U.S.	  soldiers	  and	  did	  not	  
receive	   proper	   medical	   treatment.135	   	   He	   also	   claimed	   that	   on	   numerous	  
occasions,	   U.S.	   and	   Canadian	   authorities	   improperly	   interrogated	   him,	  
aggravated	   his	   injuries,	   or	  mistreated	   him	   in	   other	  ways.136	   	   Such	   actions,	   if	  





                                                
125	  MCA,	  supra	  note	  28,	  at	  §	  948b(d).	  
126	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  37(b);	  UN	  Rules,	  supra	  note	  97,	  at	  art.	  2.	  
127	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  40(2).	  
128	  ICCPR,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  art.	  10(2).	  
129	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Omar	  Ahmed	  Khadr	  (Oct.	  25,	  2012)	  [hereinafter	  HRW],	  available	  at	  
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/25/omar-­‐ahmed-­‐khadr.	  
130	  ICCPR	  Treaty	  Status	  available	  at	  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-­‐
4&chapter=4&lang=en.	  
131	  ICCPR,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  art.	  7.	  
132	  Id.	  at	  art.	  10(1).	  
133	  Common	  Article	  III	  of	  the	  Four	  Geneva	  Conventions	  (1949).	  
134	  Id.	  
135	  Affidavit,	  supra	  note	  120.	  
136	  Id.	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b. Child-­‐Specific	  Standards	  
	  
	   International	   law	   provides	   that	   every	   child	   in	   detention	   shall	   be	  
separated	  from	  adults,137	  except	  in	  the	  unusual	  event	  that	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  child’s	  
best	   interest	   to	   do	   so.138	   	   Khadr,	   however,	   was	   detained	   with	   the	   adult	  
population	  at	  Guantánamo	   starting	  when	  he	  was	  16	   years	  old	   and	   remained	  
there	  until	   his	   release.139	   	   According	   to	   the	  CRC,	   detained	   children	   also	  have	  
the	  right	  to	  maintain	  regular	  contact	  with	  their	  family	  through	  correspondence	  
and	  visits.140	  	  Khadr	  was	  allowed	  to	  speak	  to	  his	  family	  on	  the	  phone	  only	  once	  
after	   five	   years	   of	   detention,141	   and	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   he	   was	   forbidden	   from	  
seeing	   his	   family	   in	   person.	   	   Detained	   children	   also	   have	   rights	   to	   education	  
and	   recreation,142	   and	   should	   have	   access	   to	   specialized	   juvenile	   justice	  
systems,	   with	   specially	   trained	   judges,	   prosecutors	   and	   attorneys.143	   	   U.S.	  
authorities	  never	  made	  any	  of	  these	  things	  available	  to	  Khadr,	  nor	  did	  he	  ever	  
have	   an	   opportunity	   to	   request	   that	   his	   case	   be	   transferred	   to	   a	   different	  
forum.	  
	  
V.	  	  PLEA	  AGREEMENT	  &	  SENTENCE	  
	  
A. 	  	  	  Overview	  
	  
	   Khadr	   entered	   into	   a	   plea	   agreement	   with	   the	   U.S.	   government	   in	  
2010.144	   	   In	  exchange	  for	  a	  sentence	  of	  eight	  years	  or	  fewer	  on	  all	  charges,145	  
Khadr	  would	  not	  receive	  any	  credit	  for	  time	  already	  served	  in	  U.S.	  custody.146	  	  
Furthermore,	   he	   would	   have	   to	   serve	   at	   least	   one	   more	   year	   at	  
Guantánamo.147	  	  The	  U.S.	  government	  also	  failed	  to	  give	  assurances	  regarding	  
his	   repatriation	   to	   Canada	   thereafter,148	   which	   was	   somewhat	   troubling	  
because	  the	  U.S.	  government	  would	  not	  allow	  him	  into	   its	  territory.149	   	  Many	  
                                                
137	  ICCPR,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  art.	  10(2);	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  37(c).	  
138	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  37(c).	  
139	  HRW,	  supra	  note	  130.	  
140	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  37(c).	  
141	  Canadian	  Guantanamo	  Detainee	  Calls	  Home,	  CBC	  NEWS	  CANADA	  (updated	  Mar.	  8,	  2007),	  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/03/08/khadrspeaks.html.	  
142	  See	  U.N.	  Standard	  Minimum	  Rules	  for	  the	  Administration	  of	  Juvenile	  Justice	  art.	  13.5,	  G.A.	  
Res.	  40/33	  (Nov.	  29,	  1985)	  [hereinafter	  “Beijing	  Rules”];	  U.N.	  Rules,	  supra	  note	  97,	  at	  art.	  
18(b)(c),	  38,	  47.	  
143	  Beijing	  Rules,	  supra	  note	  143,	  at	  art.	  6.3,	  22.1.	  
144	  United	  States	  v.	  Khadr,	  Offer	  for	  Pre-­‐trial	  Agreement	  (Oct.	  13,	  2010),	  ¶	  4	  [hereinafter	  Plea	  
Agreement],	  available	  at	  http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.	  
145	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  6(a).	  
146	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  2(e).	  
147	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  5(h).	  
148	  Id.	  
149	  Id.	  at	  ¶	  2(k).	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denounced	   the	   plea	   agreement,	   including	   Khadr’s	   Canadian	   attorney,	   who	  
called	  it	  a	  “piece	  of	  paper”	  and	  also	  stated	  that	  Khadr	  “would	  have	  confessed	  
to	  anything	   .	   .	   .	   just	   to	  get	  out	  of	   [that]	  hellhole.”150	   	  Khadr	  was	  24	  years	  old	  
when	  he	  was	  sentenced	  to	  eight	  more	  years	  in	  prison.151	  	  Various	  organizations	  
petitioned	   for	   Khadr’s	   repatriation	   to	   Canada.152	   	   He	   was	   later	   repatriated,	  
where	  he	  is	  currently	  serving	  the	  remainder	  of	  that	  sentence.153	  
	  
B. 	  	  	  Assessment	  
	  
i.	  	  	  	  The	  Plea	  Agreement	  
	  
	   The	   circumstances	   surrounding	   Khadr’s	   plea	   agreement	   are	   highly	  
questionable.	  	  Even	  though	  Khadr	  stipulated	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  facts	  and	  
relinquished	  certain	  critical	  rights	  “voluntarily,”154	  one	  should	  not	  presume	  that	  
he	   genuinely	   agreed	   on	   that	   basis.	   	   The	   U.S.	   government	   had	   a	   substantial	  
amount	  of	   leverage	   in	   the	  plea	  negotiations	  with	  Khadr,	   and	  as	  his	  Canadian	  
attorney	  noted,	  he	  would	  have	  confessed	  to	  virtually	  anything.155	  	  Even	  though	  
Khadr	  was	  24	  years	  old	  when	  he	  entered	  into	  the	  agreement,	  he	  had	  been	  in	  
custody	   for	  about	  eight	   years	   in	   substandard	   conditions,	   and	  charges	  against	  
him	   had	   already	   been	   dropped.156	   	   There	   was	   no	   clear	   end	   in	   sight.	   	   By	  
rejecting	   the	  plea	   agreement,	   Khadr	  would	  have	  borne	   the	   risk	  of	   reinstated	  
charges,	  an	  unfair	  trial,	  or	  perhaps	  worst	  of	  all,	  indefinite	  detention.	  
	  
ii.	  	  	  	  The	  Sentence	  
	  
Notwithstanding	   Khadr’s	   objectionable	   status	   review,	   detention,	   and	  
plea	  agreement,	  his	  final	  sentence	  was	  comparable	  to––and	  in	  some	  instances,	  
better	   than––other	   similarly	   situated	   juvenile	   defendants	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	  
abroad.157	  	  
	  
                                                
150	  Khadr	  to	  Return	  to	  Canada:	  Lawyer,	  CBC	  NEWS	  CANADA	  (updated	  Oct.	  25,	  2010),	  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/25/omar-­‐khadr-­‐trial-­‐resumes.html.	  
151	  Omar	  Khadr	  Sentenced	  to	  Symbolic	  40	  years,	  CBC	  NEWS	  CANADA	  (updated	  Oct.	  31,	  2010),	  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/31/guantanamo-­‐khadr-­‐sentencing.html.	  
152	  See,	  e.g.,	  Amnesty	  International	  Canada,	  Omar	  Khadr:	  Repatriation	  to	  Canada	  is	  the	  Only	  
Option!,	  Action	  Alert,	  available	  at	  http://www.globalresearch.ca/omar-­‐khadr-­‐repatriation-­‐to-­‐
canada-­‐is-­‐the-­‐only-­‐option/17399.	  	  
153	  CBC	  report,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
154	  Plea	  Agreement,	  supra	  note	  145,	  at	  ¶	  2(c).	  
155	  See	  also	  Part	  IV	  (B)(3)(a),	  infra,	  discussing	  the	  propensity	  of	  juveniles	  to	  falsely	  confess	  to	  
crimes.	  
156	  Guantanamo	  Judge	  Drops	  Charges	  Against	  Khadr,	  CBC	  NEWS	  CANADA	  (updated	  June	  4,	  2007),	  
available	  at	  http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2007/06/04/khadr-­‐charges.html.	  
157	  The	  following	  Section	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  address	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  death	  penalty	  under	  
international	  law,	  nor	  to	  critique	  States	  that	  have	  chosen	  to	  retain	  or	  abolish	  it	  from	  their	  
domestic	  legislation.	  
2013]	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a. American	  Perspective	  
	  
In	   the	  U.S.,	   the	  Federal	   Juvenile	  Delinquency	  Act	   (“FJDA”)	  would	  have	  
applied	   to	   Khadr’s	   case.158	   	   Under	   the	   FJDA,	   a	   juvenile	   offender	   must	   be	  
sentenced	   according	   to	   his	   or	   her	   age	   at	   the	   time	  of	   sentencing.159	   	   Because	  
Khadr	  was	  24	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time	  of	  sentencing,	  he	  would	  have	  been	  properly	  
sentenced	  as	  an	  adult.160	   	  Under	   federal	   law,	  adults	  are	   subject	   to	   the	  death	  
penalty	  for	  war	  crimes	  that	  result	  in	  the	  death	  of	  a	  victim;161	  however,	  the	  U.S.	  
Supreme	   Court	   has	   held	   that	   juvenile	   defendants	   under	   16	   years	   old	   at	   the	  
time	   of	   the	   alleged	   offense	   are	   exempt	   from	   the	   death	   penalty.162	   	   Khadr’s	  
maximum	   prison	   sentence	   also	   could	   not	   have	   exceeded	   that	   of	   a	   similarly	  
situated	   adult.163	   	   While	   the	   Federal	   Sentencing	   Guidelines	   are	   not	  
mandatory,164	  courts	  may	  still	  need	  to	  apply	  them	  in	  determining	  a	  maximum	  
possible	  term	  of	  imprisonment.	  	  Using	  the	  Guidelines	  worksheets,165	  one	  finds	  
that	   Khadr’s	   sentence	   by	   the	   military	   commission	   was	   comparable	   to	   any	  
sentence	  he	  might	  have	  received	  in	  a	  US	  district	  court.	  
	  
b. Comparative	  Perspective	  
	  
	   According	   to	   the	   ICRC,	   sentencing	   systems	   for	   war	   crimes	   vary	   widely	  
among	  States.166	  	  Some	  countries	  impose	  the	  most	  severe	  sentence	  regardless	  
of	   the	   war	   crime;	   sentences	   range	   from	   the	   death	   penalty,167	   to	   life	  
imprisonment,168	   to	   lifelong	   penal	   servitude.169	   	   Other	   countries	   distinguish	  
                                                
158	  See	  18	  USC	  §	  5031,	  Federal	  Juvenile	  Delinquency	  Act	  (defining	  “juvenile	  delinquency”	  as	  a	  
violation	  of	  U.S.	  law	  committed	  by	  a	  person	  prior	  to	  his	  eighteenth	  birthday,	  which	  would	  have	  
been	  a	  crime	  if	  committed	  by	  an	  adult)	  [hereinafter	  FJDA],	  available	  at	  
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/18C403.txt.	  
159	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Leon	  H.,	  365	  F.3d	  750,	  753	  (9th	  Cir.	  2004);	  United	  States	  v.	  K.R.A.,	  
337	  F.3d	  970,	  977	  (8th	  Cir.	  2003).	  
160	  See	  FJDA,	  supra	  note	  158,	  at	  §	  5037(c).	  
161	  18	  USC	  §	  2441(a),	  War	  Crimes	  Act,	  available	  at	  
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/18C118.txt.	  
162	  Thompson	  v.	  Oklahoma,	  487	  U.S.	  815,	  838	  (1988).	  
163	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  A.J.,	  190	  F.3d	  873,	  875	  (8th	  Cir.	  1999)	  (interpreting	  the	  FJDA).	  
164	  United	  States	  v.	  Booker,	  543	  U.S.	  220,	  264	  (2005).	  
165	  Sentencing	  Guidelines	  Worksheets	  available	  at	  
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Guidelines_Worksheets/Worksheets_for_Indivi
duals.pdf.	  
166	  ICRC,	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Punishments	  Applicable	  to	  International	  Crimes	  (War	  Crimes,	  Crimes	  
Against	  Humanity	  and	  Genocide)	  in	  Domestic	  Law	  and	  Practice,	  90	  ICRC	  REV.	  461,	  464	  (2008)	  
[hereinafter	  ICRC	  Article],	  available	  at	  http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-­‐
870_reports-­‐and-­‐documents.pdf.	  
167	  Id.	  (citing	  Burundi,	  Congo,	  Côte	  d’Ivoire	  and	  Mali	  as	  examples).	  
168	  Id.	  (citing	  Congo	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  capital	  punishment).	  
169	  Id.	  (citing	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  as	  an	  example).	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between	   fatal	   and	  non-­‐fatal	  war	   crimes.	   	   The	  U.S.,	  Nigeria,	   and	   India	   impose	  
the	   death	   penalty	   for	   fatal	   crimes,	   though	   the	   death	   penalty	   for	   juveniles	   is	  
almost	   universally	   condemned	   in	   law,170	   and	   State	   practice.171	   	   Uganda,	  
Canada,	   and	   the	   UK,	   only	   impose	   life	   imprisonment.172	   	   Some	  modern	   post-­‐
conflict	  States,	  such	  as	  Rwanda,	  have	  more	  detailed	  sentencing	  scales	  for	  war	  
crimes.173	   	   Rwanda	  was	   also	   the	   first	   country	   to	  hold	   individuals	   accountable	  
for	   war	   crimes	   committed	   when	   they	   were	   minors,174	   though	   the	   Rwandan	  
government	  has	  also	  allowed	  for	  mitigating	  circumstances.175	  
	  
VI.	  	  CONCLUSIONS	  &	  RECOMMENDATIONS	  
	  
	   Despite	   Khadr’s	   objectionable	   status	   review,	   detention,	   and	   plea	  
agreement	   under	   the	  military	   commissions	   system,	   his	   final	   sentence	  was	   at	  
least	   proportionate	   to	   the	   war	   crimes	   he	   allegedly	   committed.	   	   More	  
importantly	   though,	   Khadr’s	   case	   reminds	   the	   international	   community	   that	  
children	   need	   to	   be	   held	   accountable	   for	   their	   actions.	   	   Specifically,	   child	  
soldiers	   should	   be	  held	   as	   accountable	   for	   their	   actions	   on	   the	  battlefield	   as	  
their	   adult	   commanders.	   	   But	  what	   exactly	   does	   “accountable”	  mean	   in	   this	  
sensitive	  context?	  	  
	  
                                                
170	  CRC,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  art.	  37(a);	  ICCPR,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  art.	  6(5);	  Beijing	  Rules,	  supra	  note	  
143,	  at	  art.	  17.2.	  
171	  See,	  e.g.,	  Amnesty	  International,	  The	  World	  Moves	  Towards	  Abolition	  (2013),	  available	  at	  
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-­‐work/issues/death-­‐penalty/international-­‐death-­‐penalty.	  	  Yet,	  
child	  soldiers	  are	  still	  executed	  around	  the	  world;	  See,	  e.g.,	  Child	  Soldiers	  International,	  Child	  
Soldiers	  Global	  Report	  –	  Congo,	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  (2004)	  (where	  several	  child	  soldiers	  
were	  tried	  and	  summarily	  executed	  for	  alleged	  murder	  by	  military	  courts),	  available	  at	  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49880668c.html;	  Two	  child	  soldiers	  facing	  execution,	  
DEMOCRATIC	  VOICE	  OF	  BURMA	  (Oct.	  16,	  2009)	  (where	  two	  child	  soldiers	  faced	  execution	  for	  alleged	  
murder),	  available	  at	  http://www.dvb.no/news/two-­‐child-­‐soldiers-­‐facing-­‐execution/2978.	  	  
172	  ICRC	  Article,	  supra	  note	  166,	  at	  464.	  
173	  See	  Repressing	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide,	  Crimes	  against	  Humanity	  and	  War	  Crimes,	  Law	  No.	  
33	  bis/2003	  (Sept.	  6,	  2003)	  available	  at	  http://www.geneva-­‐
academy.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Law-­‐33bis-­‐2003-­‐Crimes-­‐Genocide-­‐cah-­‐war.pdf.	  
174	  See	  Setting	  Up	  “Gacaca	  Jurisdictions”	  and	  Organizing	  Prosecutions	  for	  Offences	  Constituting	  
the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide	  or	  Crimes	  Against	  Humanity	  Committed	  Between	  Oct.	  1,	  1990	  and	  Dec.	  
31,	  1994	  art.	  74,	  Organic	  Law	  No.	  40/2000	  (Jan.	  26,	  2001)	  (mandating	  prison	  sentences	  for	  
individuals	  between	  14-­‐18	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time	  of	  commission,	  and	  placement	  in	  
“rehabilitation	  centers”	  for	  persons	  under	  14	  years	  old),	  available	  at	  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/452e37514.html.	  	  	  
175	  See	  Establishing	  the	  Organisation,	  Competence,	  and	  Functioning	  of	  Gacaca	  Courts	  Charged	  
with	  Prosecuting	  and	  Trying	  the	  Perpetrators	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide	  and	  Other	  Crimes	  
against	  Humanity,	  Committed	  between	  Oct.	  1,	  1990	  and	  Dec.	  31,	  1994	  art.	  16,	  Organic	  Law	  No.	  
10/2007	  (Mar.	  1,	  2007),	  modifying	  Organic	  Law	  No.	  16/2004	  (June	  19,	  2004),	  available	  at	  
http://www.geneva-­‐academy.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/2007-­‐Gacaca-­‐Crts-­‐Organic-­‐Law-­‐10-­‐2007-­‐3-­‐
languages-­‐.pdf.	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   As	  discussed	  in	  Part	  III,	  infra,	  international	  law	  views	  children––owing	  to	  
their	   immaturity	   and	   lack	  of	   experience––as	  particularly	   vulnerable,	   and	   that	  
child	  soldiers	  are	  often	  victims	  of	  a	   larger	  scheme	  arising	   from	  their	  political,	  
social,	   or	   economic	   circumstances.	   	   Accordingly,	   children	   are	   entitled	   to	  
greater	  protections	  under	  the	  law	  and	  should	  receive	  treatment	  in	  accordance	  
with	  those	  standards.	  	  This	  recognition	  does	  not	  imply,	  however,	  that	  children	  
should	   not	   be	   held	   accountable	   at	   all.	   	   Failure	   to	   hold	   children	   accountable	  
could	   have	   devastating	   consequences,	   such	   as	   commanders	   delegating	   their	  
most	   atrocious	   tasks	   to	   children.	   	   This	   lack	   of	   accountability	   may	   allow	  
commanders	   to	   escape	   superior	   liability,	   thereby	   indirectly	   continuing	   to	  
expose	  children	   to	   the	  same	  risks	   from	  which	   the	   international	  community	   is	  
trying	   to	   protect	   them.	   	   For	   this	   reason,	   governments	   should	   hold	   them	  
accountable,	  but	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  in	  a	  different	  way	  than	  adults.	  	  
	   Of	   course,	   the	   appropriate	   form	   of	   accountability	   will	   have	   to	   be	  
determined	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   and	   should	   not	   depend	   on	   age	   alone.	  	  
Some	  children	  join	  armed	  groups	  voluntarily	  and	  are	  clearly	  in	  control	  of	  their	  
actions,	  not	  having	  been	  coerced,	  drugged,	  or	  forced	  to	  commit	  atrocities.	  	  For	  
those	   children	   that	   commit	   the	   most	   heinous	   crimes	   and	   thus	   require	   the	  
greatest	  attention,	  I	  propose	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  specialized	  international	  juvenile	  
chamber	  within	  the	  ICC.	  	  The	  chamber	  would	  consist	  of	  highly	  trained	  judges,	  
attorneys,	   and	   investigators	   in	   the	   field	   of	   international	   juvenile	   justice	   and	  
would	   thus	   be	   better	   equipped	   to	   address	   children’s	   needs	   than	   the	   current	  
alternatives.	  	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  child	  soldiers,	  however,	  do	  not	  fall	  into	  that	  
category.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  accountability	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  require	  criminal	  proceedings,	  and	  other	  options,	  considered	  below,	  
exist	  that	  may	  be	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  a	  particular	  child.	  	  
	   In	   light	   of	   these	   considerations,	   Khadr’s	   sentence	   was	   appropriate	   but	  
does	   not	   justify	   the	   means	   used	   (see	   Part	   IV,	   infra).	   	   Military	   courts	   are	  
generally	   inappropriate	   for	   trying	   civilian	   offenders,	   and	   the	   CRC	   Committee	  
has	  urged	   that	  children	  be	  exempt	   from	  military	   tribunals.176	  Due	   to	  national	  
security	  concerns,	  military	  hearings	  are	  often	  conducted	  “in	  camera”	  and	  may	  
not	   be	   independent	   and	   impartial.	   	   Juvenile	   justice	   standards,	   due	   process	  
safeguards,	  and	  adequate	  detention	  conditions	  are	  usually	  not	  guaranteed.177	  	  
Finally,	   children	   frequently	   lack	   assistance	   of	   counsel	   or	   their	   parents	   or	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  United	  States	  of	  America,	  Concluding	  Observations:	  Rep.	  Submitted	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  art.	  8,	  ¶¶	  
29-­‐30,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  CRC/C/OPAC/USA/CO1	  (June	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  available	  at	  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/co/CRC.C.OPAC.USA.CO.1.pdf.	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  Special	  Representative	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  Ms.	  Radhika	  Coomaraswamy,	  Statement	  on	  
the	  Occasion	  of	  the	  Trial	  of	  Omar	  Khadr	  before	  the	  Guantánamo	  Military	  Commission	  (Aug.	  9,	  
2010),	  available	  at	  http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/statements/9-­‐august-­‐2010-­‐trial-­‐of-­‐
omar-­‐khadr/.	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guardians,	   and	   may	   not	   have	   access	   to	   the	   charges	   brought	   against	   them.	  	  
Military	   courts	   are	   not	   required	   to	   treat	   children’s	   best	   interests	   as	   their	  
primary	   concern––contrary	   to	   the	   object	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   CRC––and	   thus	  
are	   inappropriate	   for	   trying	   children.	   	   Most	   of	   these	   shortcomings	   were	  
apparent	  in	  Khadr’s	  case	  and	  should	  be	  avoided	  at	  all	  costs	  in	  future	  cases.	  
	   Even	   if	   States	   insist	   upon	   using	   military	   proceedings,	   they	   can	   take	  
certain	  measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  children’s	  rights	  are	  protected.	  	  Governments	  
should	  periodically	  review	  their	  domestic	  laws	  to	  ensure	  that	  detention	  occurs	  
only	  where	  children	  pose	  a	  serious	  security	  risk,	  as	  a	   last	  resort,	   for	  the	   least	  
amount	   of	   time	   possible,	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   juvenile-­‐appropriate	  
standards	   under	   international	   law.	   	   States	   should	   also	   ensure	   that	   children	  
have	  access	  to	  their	  parents	  or	  guardians	  and	  competent	  legal	  representation.	  	  
Governments	   should	   seek	   to	   provide	   viable	   alternatives	   to	   detention,	  
prosecution,	   or	   other	   punitive	   measures	   whenever	   possible,	   such	   as	  
restorative	   justice	   mechanisms	   and	   community-­‐based	   diversion	   programs	  
aiming	  at	  the	  rehabilitation	  and	  reintegration	  of	  children	  into	  society.	  
	   The	  futures	  of	  delinquent	  children	   like	  Omar	  Khadr	  are	  defined	  by	  their	  
brief	   but	   formative	   experiences	   with	   judicial	   systems.	   	   Whether	   those	  
experiences	   positively	   change	   their	   lives	   depends	   on	   the	   actions	   of	   national	  
governments,	  which	  have	  a	  legal	  and	  moral	  obligation	  to	  serve	  children’s	  best	  
interests.	   	   Regrettably,	   the	   U.S.	   has	   failed	   to	   ratify	   the	   CRC	   to	   date,178	   and	  
should	  do	  so	  immediately	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  and	  the	  sake	  of	  children	  around	  the	  
world.	  	  As	  a	  policy	  matter,	  the	  U.S.’s	  reputation	  and	  credibility	  in	  international	  
discussions	   concerning	   children	   have	   suffered	   because	   of	   its	   failure.	   	   193	  
countries	  have	  ratified	  or	  acceded	  to	  the	  CRC,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  joins	  Somalia	  as	  the	  
only	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  that	  have	  not.179	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Part	  IV,	  infra,	  
several	  CRC	  articles	  are	  especially	   important	  for	  safeguarding	  children’s	  rights	  
in	   criminal	   proceedings.	   	   Ratification	   would	   help	   ensure	   that	   all	   children,	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  Treaty	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